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SURVEY ARTICLES
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Between June 1984 and March 1985, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals decided over 150 criminal cases. This survey will discuss
the significant developments concerning the exclusionary rule, and
other fourth amendment issues, 2 custodial interrogations,a ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel,4 and prisoners' rights.5
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. The Exclusionary Rule
In United States v. Sager, 6 the Eighth Circuit interpreted and applied
retroactively the recent United States Supreme Court decision in
United States v. Leon. 7 In Leon, the Court held that evidence seized
under a warrant is admissible, even though the warrant might later
be held to be based on an affidavit that failed to establish probable
cause, if the officers executing the warrant reasonably relied upon it.8
In Sager, federal agents obtained an order from a United States
magistrate allowing them to install a beeper in an airplane used by
1. See United States v. Sager, 743 F.2d 1261 (8th Cir. 1984); infra notes 6-35 and
accompanying text.
2. See Garmon v. Foust, 741 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Morales,
737 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1984); infra notes 36-86 and accompanying text.
3. See United States v. Dockery, 736 F.2d 1232 (8th Cir. 1984); infra notes 87-
101 and accompanying text.
4. See Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir.), rehearing en banc denied, 750
F.2d 713 (1984), cert. granted sub nom. Nix v. Whiteside, 53 U.S.L.W. 3739 (U.S. Apr.
15, 1985) (No. 84-1321); Bell v. Lockhart, 741 F.2d 1105 (8th Cir. 1984); infra notes
102-31 and accompanying text.
5. See Parker v. Corrothers, 750 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1984); Martin v. White, 742
F.2d 469 (8th Cir. 1984); Hahn v. McLey, 737 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1984); infra notes
133-76 and accompanying text.
6. 743 F.2d 1261. Sager was first heard as United States v. Little, 735 F.2d 1049
(8th Cir. 1984). On appeal, the case did not involve as many defendants and was
heard as United States v. Sager, 743 F.2d 1261.
7. 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
8. Id. at 3421. In the past few years, commentators have discussed whether
courts would implement a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. See Ingber,
Defending the Citadel: The Dangerous Attack of "'Reasonable Good Faith, " 36 VAND. L. REV.
1511 (1983); Comment, The Evolution and Confusion of Exclusion: Does "Good Faith"
Make Good Sense Under the Fourth Amendment?, 1983 DET. C.L. REV. 1587; Note, The
Exclusionary Rule and Good Faith Exception: Is It Time for a Change?, 35 MERCER L. REV.
699 (1984); Comment, Proposal For a Workable Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary
Rule: Prospective Judgments, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1113 (1984).
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the defendants to transport marijuana. 9 The device was used to
track flights between Jamaica and the United States.O The defend-
ants were later convicted of conspiracy and drug charges."I On ap-
peal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the convictions of two of the three
defendants.12 A three-judge panel held that the affidavit used to
support the warrant was insufficient and that the magistrate's order
authorizing installation of the beeper was therefore invalid.t3
The government petitioned for a rehearing of the two reversed
convictions in light of Leon, which had been decided less than two
months after the Eighth Circuit's decision. The government argued
that because the officers' reliance on the warrant was objectively rea-
sonable, the convictions should be reinstated.14 The defendants ar-
gued that Leon should not be retroactively applied, because it
represented a clear break with past fourth amendment case law.15
The defendants also argued that the affidavit for the warrant was "so
plainly insufficient as not to justify any reasonable officer in relying
upon it."16 The defendants contended that the case should be re-
manded for an evidentiary hearing in light of Leon. '7
The Eighth Circuit granted the petition for rehearing and agreed
with the government's contention that Leon should apply. A three-
judge panel held that the agents who executed the warrant behaved
in an objectively reasonable fashion, and therefore an additional evi-
dentiary hearing was not necessary.' 8
The court rejected the defendants' argument that Leon should not
be applied retroactively.19 The court agreed that Leon was a clear
departure from previous case law, but nevertheless decided that it
could be applied to the defendants' case. The panel pointed out that
9. Little, 735 F.2d at 1051; see supra note 6.
10. 735 F.2d at 1051.
11. Id. at 1052. Five persons-Fulbright, Harmon, Little, Livesay, and Sager-
were originally charged. Fulbright was given immunity from prosecution in ex-
change for his testimony, while Livesay was charged with only a misdemeanor in ex-
change for cooperating with the government. Id. The other three defendants were
convicted. See id.
12. Id. at 1057. Little's conviction was affirmed based on the court's ruling that
he did not have standing to challenge the court order authorizing installation of the
beeper. Id. at 1052-53.
13. Id. at 1054-56.
14. 743 F.2d at 1262.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id at 1265-66.
19. Id. at 1263-64. See generally United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 549
(1982) (fourth amendment decision is applied retroactively to all convictions not yet
final at time decision rendered, subject to exception that it is not to be applied where
it is "a clear break with the past").
[Vol. I11
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a criminal procedure decision which expands the rights of defend-
ants is usually not applied retroactively, since such an application
would "disappoint the reasonable reliance of the authorities on what
they thought was the law."20 According to the court, however, the
Leon standard was less favorable to the Sager defendants than the old
standard, and its retroactive application would therefore not infringe
on the government's reliance interest.
2 '
The court also disposed of the defendants' arguments that, even if
Leon did govern, the defendants came within one of the exceptions
outlined in Leon and thus the exclusionary rule should apply. Under
Leon, the exclusionary rule may still apply in exceptional situations:
(1) if the issuing official "was misled by information in an affidavit
that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except
for his reckless disregard of the truth;" 22 (2) if the issuing official
abandoned his judicial role, thus becoming a rubber stamp for the
police;23 (3) if the affidavit is "so lacking in indicia of probable cause
as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable;"24
or (4) if the warrant is so facially deficient that the executing officers
cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.25
The defendants first argued that the affidavit for the warrant
clearly failed to establish probable cause and thus "no objectively
.reasonable officer could have relied upon it."26 They further main-
tained that Leon requires officers to act in good faith and that this
issue was not litigated in the district court. 27 The Eighth Circuit,
however, disagreed with the defendants' interpretation of Leon. The
court stated:
Although courts and lawyers have for some time discussed the pro-
posed 'good faith' exception to the exclusionary rule, and although
Leon is said, in some short-hand descriptions, to have adopted this
exception, that is not at all what the Supreme Court has done. The
20. Sager, 743 F.2d at 1264.
21. Id.; see also Solem v. Stumes, 104 S. Ct. 1338, 1341 (1984). The court also
pointed out that on the day Leon was decided, the United States Supreme Court va-
cated and remanded several courts of appeal cases in light of Leon. Sager, 743 F.2d at
1264. The court stated, "This action makes no sense unless the Court intended the
lower courts to apply Leon. " Id. The court further stated that it opted to apply the
traditional rule of retroactivity set forth in Solem. Id. at 1265. In Solem, the United
States Supreme Court stated, "As a rule, judicial decisions apply 'retroactively.' In-
deed, a legal system based on precedent has a built-in presumption of retroactivity."
104 S. Ct. at 1341 (citation omitted).
22. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3421-22 (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978)).
23. Id. at 3422.
24. Id. (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11 (1975) (Powell, J., con-
curring in part)).
25. Id.
26. Sager, 743 F.2d at 1265.
27. Id.
107519851
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Court, in fact, has been at pains to explain that it is objective rea-
sonableness, not subjective good faith, that is important. 28
As a result, the court held that an additional evidentiary hearing on
the issue of the agents' good faith as requested by the defendants
was not necessary. 29
The court instead considered the defendants' claims that they
were within the Leon exceptions based on the present record. The
court conceded that the affidavit used to support the warrant did
contain several deficiencies.30 Nevertheless, the court rejected the
defendants' contention that no police officer examining the affidavit
could have believed that there was probable cause. 3 ' The court dis-
missed the defendants' argument that the affidavit contained mate-
rial misstatements of fact and that the police officer acting upon the
warrant supported by the affidavit either knew that portions of the
affidavit were false or acted in reckless disregard of whether they
were true. The court admitted that the affidavit did contain certain
inaccuracies, 3 2 but nevertheless relied on the lower court's finding
that the officer who made the affidavit did not act recklessly.33 Fi-
nally, the court disagreed with the defendants' claim that they should
be allowed to show that the magistrate who issued the warrant was
not neutral and detached but rather acted as a rubber stamp.3 4 The
court maintained that the defendants were merely arguing that the
affidavit was so insufficient that any magistrate who would have ap-
proved it must have been a rubber stamp, a contention the court had
already rejected.35
B. Other Fourth Amendment Developments
In two other cases, the Eighth Circuit faced equally compelling
28. Id.
29. See id.
30. Id. at 1266. The court admitted that, like the affidavit at issue in Leon, some
of the information in the affidavit in Sager "was stale, the affidavit failed to establish
the informant's credibility, and much of the conduct attributed to the defendants was
consistent with lawful behavior." Id.
31. Id; see Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3423. In Leon, the officer's affidavit contained the
results of an extensive investigation. Id. Under these circumstances, the officers
could reasonably rely on the magistrate's determination that probable cause existed.
Id.
32. Sager, 743 F.2d at 1266.
33. Id. While certain inaccuracies may have thrown some doubt on the conclu-
sion of probable cause, the conclusion was not clearly erroneous. Id. As such, the
convictions were affirmed. Id. at 1267.
34. Id. at 1266-67; see Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 327 (1979)
(magistrate became member of police operation and thus failed to act as a judicial
officer).
35. Sager, 743 F.2d at 1266-67.
1076 [Vol. I11
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fourth amendment issues. In United States v. Morales, 36 the court held
that the government lost its right to challenge the defendant's stand-
ing to seek suppression of cocaine seized in a warrantless search of a
motel room.
3 7
In Morales, a police officer observed suspicious activity in a motel
room and later learned that the room was rented to the defendant
and another person.38 The officer also learned that the room re-
ceived many telephone calls and that callers often asked to be con-
nected to a second room if there was no answer at the first.39 The
officer, accompanied by another officer, went to the first room,
knocked and announced their presence. 40 The two occupants let
them in and the officers immediately noticed drug paraphenalia in
plain view.41 The officers read the occupants their Miranda warning
and placed them under arrest.42 During the arrest, the officers no-
ticed Morales placing his hand under a chair cushion where the of-
ficers found a key to the second room.43 Morales' companion denied
that he or Morales had an interest in the key.44 The officers searched
the second room without a warrant and found, among other things,
twenty-one ounces of cocaine.45 The district court found Morales
guilty of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.46 On ap-
peal, Morales argued that the district court erred in denying his mo-
tion to suppress the evidence seized during the warrantless search of
the first room. 47
At the pretrial suppression hearing, the government argued that
since the defendant disclaimed knowledge of the key, the room may
have been burglarized and therefore the officers had the right to
search the room. 48 The district court agreed that the officers had the
right to search the room.49 At trial, however, the government intro-
duced the incriminating evidence of the defendant's constructive
36. 737 F.2d 761.
37. Id. at 763.
38. Id. at 762.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. The officers, however, had difficulty communicating with the occupants
because the occupants spoke only Spanish. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. The officers communicated through Carlos Diaz, the other occupant, who
understood broken English. Id.
45. Id. The officers also found $17,000 in cash, a handgun, and other narcotics
paraphernalia. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 764.
48. Id. at 762.
49. Id. at 762-63. The district court based its finding on Morales' possession of
the key and his disclaimer of any knowledge of the key. Id.
107719851
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possession of the room and the key.50
On appeal, the government argued that the defendant did not
have standing to challege the search since he failed to demonstrate a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the second room.5' The Eighth
Circuit held that the government lost its right to challenge the de-
fendant's standing because of inconsistent positions and reversed
Morales' conviction.52 The three-judge panel noted that under cer-
tain circumstances, a disclaimer of an interest in property may consti-
tute an abandonment, thus implying a renunciation of any
reasonable expectation of privacy.55 Abandonment, the court ad-
ded, is a question of fact, and the lower court's finding of abandon-
ment will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. 54 In Morales,
the issue of abandonment was never presented to the district court.
Instead, the district court found that although the defendant dis-
claimed knowledge of the key, he still possessed it.55 The Eighth
Circuit pointed out that a mere disclaimer of a property interest
made before a police search does not defeat standing and therefore
the defendant could challenge the search.56
The court also agreed with Morales' assertion that the government
failed to demonstrate that the warrantless search of the room was
justified by an exception to the warrant requirement.57 The court
held that the officers did not have a reasonable belief that a burglary
was being committed.58 Such a belief may have allowed a warrant-
less search because of exigent circumstances.5O Accordingly, they
should have applied for a warrant prior to searching the room.
In another search and seizure case, Garmon v. Foust,60 the Eighth
Circuit considered whether a police officer violated a college stu-
dent's fourth amendment rights by seizing and searching, without a
warrant, a package which had been mailed to the student. A package
50. Id at 763.
51. Id.; see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139 (1978) (proper fourth amendment
focus should be whether the defendant has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
searched premises; defendant has burden of establishing a legitimate expectation of
privacy).
52. Morales, 737 F.2d at 763, 765.
53. Id.; see United States v. Alden, 576 F.2d 772, 777 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 855 (1978).
54. Morales, 737 F.2d at 763 (citing Alden, 576 F.2d at 777).
55. Id. at 63.
56. Id. (citing 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 11.3, at 548-49 (1978)).
57. Id. at 764-65.
58. Id. at 765.
59. See id. at 764; see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 104 S. Ct. 2091, 2097 (1984) (ex-
ceptions to warrant requirement are "'few in number and carefully delineated' ";
"police bear a heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that
might justify warrantless searches or arrests").
60. 741 F.2d 1069.
[Vol. I11
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addressed to Garmon was delivered to the receptionist at the resi-
dence hall of the private university that Garmon attended.61 The re-
ceptionist became suspicious of the package's smell, and other
employees who smelled the package suspected that it contained ma-
rijuana.62 The next day a municipal police officer, Foust, came to the
hall director's office where the package had been placed for safe
keeping.63 After a trained police dog was able to find the package in
the office, Foust took the package into his possession, prepared a
search warrant, and took the package before a district court judge.64
Before signing the warrant, the judge ordered Foust to open the
package. 65 Foust obeyed, found marijuana, and then resealed the
package. 66 Later that day, the. package was returned to the residence
hall with a note asking Garmon to pick up his package. 67 After he
picked it up, police officers executed the search warrant for his dor-
mitory room, seized the package, and arrested Garmon. 68
Since the seized evidence was later suppressed, the state did not
pursue criminal charges. Garmon, however, brought a section 1983
action against Foust, alleging that the officer violated his fourth
amendment rights by unlawfully seizing and searching the package
without first obtaining a warrant. 69 The district court directed a ver-
dict for Garmon on the issue of liability for the seizure of the package
and the officer appealed. 7o
On appeal, a majority of a three-judge panel reversed. 71 Consid-
ering only the issue of Foust's liability arising from taking possesion
of the unopened package and transporting it from the residence hall
61. Id. at 1071. The receptionist noticed a strong smell coming from the package
and "that it felt as if it contained hay." Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1070. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory of the District of Columbia, sub-
jects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privi-
leges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceed-
ing for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
70. 741 F.2d at 1070-71. The issue of damages was submitted to thejury, which
returned a verdict of one dollar. Foust contended that "he was entitled to qualified
immunity as a matter of law." Id.
71. Id. at 1075.
1985]
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without a warrant, the court held that the initial seizure was valid. 72
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals first determined that the of-
ficer's detention of the package, even though it was in the mail, was
reasonable. 73 The court relied on the United States Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Van Leeuwen, 74 which held that a
package in the mail may be detained pending further investigation if
there is reasonable suspicion to believe that it contains contraband.75
The Eighth Circuit maintained that Foust had a reasonable suspicion
and thus he was authorized to detain the package pending the issu-
ance of a warrant. 76 Because the officer did not open the package
until ordered by a judge, Garmon's privacy interest was not
invaded.77
In addition, the court stated that exigent circumstances supported
the officer's seizure of the package.78 The court, applying a balanc-
ing test, held that the risk that the package might be lost before a
warrant could be obtained outweighed Garmon's interest in posses-
sion of the package. 79 The court conceded that university employees
had intruded upon Garmon's right to possession of the package by
taking it out of the mail.8 0 Nevertheless, no fourth amendment in-
terest had been violated since Foust's actions did not go significantly
beyond the private actions of the employees.8 1
Judge Heaney dissented. He maintained that the majority ignored
the lower court's finding that the package was in the mail.8 2 As a
result, he argued that Garmon had a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy of mail regardless of "whether or not it passes through the
72. Id. at 1072, 1074-75. Foust argued that because the package had already
been seized by university officials, his receipt of the package did not amount to a
seizure under the fourth amendment. Id. at 1072. The court, however, relying on
United States v. Jacobsen, held that a seizure had taken place. Id. at 1072-73. In Jacob-
sen, the United States Supreme Court held that a " 'seizure' of property occurs when
there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessionary interests in
that property." 104 S. Ct. at 1656. Thus, Foust was not entitled to summary judg-
ment on the ground that his actions did not constitute a seizure. Garmon, 741 F.2d at
1072.
73. 741 F.2d at 1072.
74. 397 U.S. 249 (1970).
75. Id. at 252-53.
76. Garmon, 741 F.2d at 1073.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1073-74; see also United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2641 (1983)
(United States Supreme Court has interpreted fourth amendment to allow seizure of
property without warrant if exigent circumstances demand it).
79. Garmon, 741 F.2d at 1074. "Although with the advantage of hindsight it may
appear that the risk of the package's disappearance was small, Foust was not required
to entrust this valuable evidence of crime to private parties." Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1076 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
1080 [Vol. I11
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hands of private parties en route to the addressee."83 Judge Heaney
then addressed the issue of whether the warrantless seizure was rea-
sonable. He distinguished Van Leeuwen by pointing out that in Gar-
mon, the officer took the package back to the police station, rather
than merely holding it at the post office, as was done in Van
Leeuwen.8 4 Thus, Foust's actions did not constitute the limited deten-
tion authorized by Van Leeuwen.
Judge Heaney also rejected the majority's exigent circumstances
argument. According to Judge Heaney, the lower court found that
the risk that the package would be lost was remote. Thus, the court's
conclusion was unsupported by factual findings.85 As a result, Judge
Heaney argued that the court's holding encouraged an overly broad
definition of what constitutes exigent circumstances.86
II. FIFTH AMENDMENT DEVELOPMENTS
During the 1984-1985 term, the Eighth Circuit handed down a
number of decisions dealing with fifth amendment issues. The most
interesting case was United States v. Dockery, 8 7 which presented diffi-
cult issues relating to custodial interrogations for the purposes of
Miranda warnings.
In October of 1982, FBI special agents interviewed Diane Dockery
concerning theft from her employer, a federally insured bank.88 She
denied any knowledge of the thefts, even though a fellow employee
made a statement claiming that both he and Dockery had embezzled
funds.89 One month later, Dockery was summoned into a small of-
fice in the bank for further questioning90 She was told that she did
not have to answer any questions, that she was not under arrest, and
that she was free to leave at any time.91 No Miranda warnings were
given.92 Dockery continued -to deny any involvement in the thefts
and the interview terminated.93 A few minutes later, she asked to
talk to the agents, who again advised her that she did not have to talk
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1076-77.
85. Id. at 1077. "Only the remotest possibility exists that the package would
have been lost or accidentally given to Garmon." Id.
86. Id.
87. 736 F.2d 1232 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 197 (1984).
88. Id. at 1233.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. FBI agents told Dockery that they believed she was involved in the thefts
and that they had her fingerprints. The only fingerprints they had, however, were
those taken from her bank personnel records. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1233-34.
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9
et al.: Criminal Procedure
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1985
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW
to them and was free to leave.94 She again denied any involvement,
and thus an agent informed her that he was not interested in hearing
her story again. He then asked, "Why don't you tell me what hap-
pened?" 9 5 Dockery then gave a statement implicating herself in the
thefts.96
At a pretrial hearing, Dockery moved to suppress her confession
since she was not allowed to speak to an attorney during the inter-
views, even though agents denied that she had asked to see an attor-
ney. The district court disregarded her contentions that she was not
allowed to speak with counsel and concluded that the two interroga-
tions resulting in her confession were neither custodial nor im-
permissively coercive.97 Dockery was convicted of seventeen counts
of embezzlement.
On appeal, a panel of the Eighth Circuit reversed Dockery's con-
viction.98 The government's petition for rehearing en banc was
granted. The full court then affirmed her conviction.99 The court
rejected Dockery's argument that her conviction violated her fifth
amendment right against self-incrimination because she was not
given a Miranda warning.' 0 0 The Eighth Circuit relied on the district
court's finding that Dockery was not in custody and that her confes-
sion was voluntary.' 0 '
94. Id. at 1234.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. United States v. Dockery, 718 F.2d 850 (8th Cir. 1983), af'den banc, 736 F.2d
1232 (8th Cir. 1984).
99. Dockery, 736 F.2d 1232.
100. The court primarily relied on United States v. Jones, 630 F.2d 613 (8th Cir.
1980) (per curiam), a factually similar case in which the defendant was also informed
that she was not under arrest and was free to refuse to answer questions. Id. at 614-
15. The defendant in Jones, like Dianne Dockery, was an employee of a federally
insured bank and was also accused of embezzlement. Id. at 614. The Jones court
agreed with the lower court's finding that there was no evidence indicating that the
defendant was in custody for purposes of Miranda. Id. at 615-16; see also Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Thus, the Jones court held that Jones' incriminating
statements were admissible. 630 F.2d at 616.
101. Dockery, 736 F.2d at 1234. The court pointed out that although Dockery was
asked to wait in the reception area after the first interview, she initiated the second
interview. Id.
Three judges dissented in Dockery. Judge McMillan, joined by Judges Bright and
Heaney, argued that the district court's finding should be reversed for the reasons set
forth in the earlier panel opinion. The three dissenters were the panel members who
had earlier reversed Dockery's conviction. See Dockery, 718 F.2d at 850.
Judge McMillian wrote the earlier opinion, in which he argued that the defend-
ant was in custody at the time of the interrogations. See id. In his dissent, he again
emphasized that Dockery had been summoned to a small vacant office where she was
employed, interrogated by agents while she was alone in a small office with the door
closed, and was not in the midst of familiar surroundings at home like the defendant
1082 [Vol. I11
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III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
In 1984, the Eighth Circuit decided two significant cases involving
assistance of counsel issues: Whiteside v. Scurrl02 and Bell v.
Lockhart. 103
In Whiteside, the Eighth Circuit again faced the difficult task of de-
termining what constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. In at-
tempting to state what must be proven before a conviction may be
overturned on the basis of an attorney's improper handling of a case,
the court made a rather controversial holding.
An Iowa state court jury convicted Whiteside of second degree
murder in 1977.104 Whiteside maintained that he had stabbed the
victim in self-defense.tO5 According to Whiteside, the victim reached
for a gun under a pillow when Whiteside stabbed him.106 Before
trial, Whiteside told his counsel that he had not actually seen a gun,
but was convinced that the victim had one.' 0 7 A gun was never
found.108 Whiteside's counsel advised him that his defense would be
successful if they could show that Whiteside reasonably believed that
the victim had a gun.1 09 Before trial, Whiteside told his attorney that
he had seen something metallic in the victim's hand immediately
in Jones. Dockery, 736 F.2d at 1235 (McMillian, J., dissenting). Thus, he maintained
that Dockery's statements should not have been admitted. Id. Judge McMillian also
added that the agents' affirmative misrepresentation to the defendant about the fin-
gerprint evidence, "although not relevant to the question of custody for Miranda pur-
poses, is not the type of interrogation technique we should condone and is clearly
relevant to the voluntariness of the confession." Id.
The United States Supreme Court recently narrowed Miranda significantly in Or-
egon v. Elstad, 53 U.S.L.W. 4244 (Mar. 5, 1985). In an opinion by Justice O'Connor,
the Court held that the defendant's fifth amendment rights were not violated when
the defendant made an incriminating statement, before the police gave him a Miranda
warning, when the police later read a Miranda warning and the suspect then gave a
voluntary written confession. Id. at 4250. The Court rejected the Oregon Court of
Appeal's holding that the defendant's earlier statements would have a coercive im-
pact on the defendant's later confession stating, "there is no warrant for presuming
coercive effect where the suspect's initial inculpatory statement, though technically in
violation of Miranda, was voluntary." Id.
102. 744 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir.), rehearing en banc denied, 750 F.2d 713 (1984), cert.
granted sub nom. Nix v. Whiteside, 53 U.S.L.W. 3739 (U.S. Apr. 15, 1985) (No. 84-
1321).
103. 741 F.2d 1105 (8th Cir. 1984).
104. 744 F.2d at 1325.
105. Id. Whiteside had gone to the victim's apartment to get some marijuana and
an argument ensued. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. Whiteside was convinced that the victim had a gun since he had the repu-
tation of carrying a gun. Id. His companions did not see a gun, but they told White-
side's counsel that they also thought the victim carried a weapon. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1325-26.
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before stabbing the victim." 0 The attorney told Whiteside that if he
insisted upon testifying that he actually saw a gun, the attorney
would withdraw from the case, advise the trial judge that Whiteside's
testimony was perjurious, and testify against him."'
Following his conviction, Whiteside appealed to the Iowa Supreme
Court, alleging that his attorney's actions denied him a fair trial. The
court, however, disagreed and concluded that Whiteside's counsel
had not acted improperly.1 2 Whiteside then petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus in federal district court. The writ was denied.'13
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed.' 14 A three-judge panel
agreed with Whiteside's contentions that his attorney's conduct de-
nied Whiteside the effective assistance of counsel.1t5 While the
court conceded that the attorney had legitimate ethical concerns, his
actions were nevertheless "inconsistent with the obligations of confi-
dentiality and zealous advocacy."' 16 In addition, the court held that
the attorney's actions forced Whiteside to "choose between two con-
stitutional rights, the right to testify in one's own defense and the
right to effective assistance of counsel, and infringed both."'17 The
court, relying on recent United States Supreme Court decisions, fur-
ther held that Whiteside did not have to show actual prejudice in
proving that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. is
110. Id. at 1326.
111. Id.
112. State v. Whiteside, 272 N.W.2d 468, 471 (Iowa 1978). The Iowa Supreme
Court found that Whiteside's counsel had good cause to believe that Whiteside's
testimony was untruthful and thus the attorney "properly refused to be a partner in
such a dishonest and deceitful scheme." Id. The court went on to commend White-
side's counsel for the highly ethical manner in which the case was handled. Id.
113. Whiteside v. Scurr, No. Civil-81-246-C, slip op. at 2 (S.D. Iowa Dec. 7, 1982).
114. 744 F.2d at 1331.
115. Id. The court also addressed whether Whiteside had exhausted his available
state remedies. Id. at 1326. The district court concluded that because the Iowa
Supreme Court had already determined that the state code of professional responsi-
bility vindicated counsel's actions and had even commended the attorney's actions,
further state proceedings would be futile. Id. The Eighth Circuit agreed, stating that
"the substance of appellant's federal habeas corpus ground for relief was fairly
presented to the state courts." Id. at 1327.
116. Id. at 1329. The court cautioned that it was not concerned with the ethical
dilemma faced by Whiteside's counsel. Instead, the court stated that it was con-
cerned only with whether the constitutional requirements of due process and effec-
tive assistance of counsel were met. Id. at 1327.
117. Id. at 1330.
118. Id. The court relied on Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984),
and United States v. Cronic, 104 S. Ct. 2039 (1984). These cases set forth the appro-
priate test for prejudice in ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Under Strickland
and Cronic, the defendant has the burden of showing that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2068; cf. Cronic, 104 S. Ct. at 2046 n.23 (bur-
den on defendant to prove that counsel's failure to conscientiously discharge duties
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The government moved to have the case reheard en banc, arguing
that the court's earlier opinion created a right to commit perjury.
The court denied the motion and attempted to clarify its earlier
holding.1 9 Judge McMillian maintained that the earlier opinion ex-
pressly stated that a defendant's right to testify in his or her own
defense "does not include the right to commit perjury."120 He fur-
ther wrote:
We hold only that a lawyer who has a firm factual basis for believ-
ing that his or her client is about to commit perjury, because of
confidential communications the client has made to the lawyer, may
not disclose the content of those confidential communications to
the trier of fact, in the present case the jury.
12 '
In April of 1985, the United States Supreme Court granted certio-
rari in Whiteside122 and will confront for the first time the dilemma
faced by the lawyer whose client intends to lie.123
In Bell v. Lockhart, the defendant was convicted of aggravated rob-
bery and interference with a law-enforcement officer. 124 At the state
court trial, Bell's counsel chose not to move for a directed verdict at
denied defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial). Prejudice may be presumed,
however, if the defendant can show that counsel represented conflicting interests and
that this conflict adversely affected the lawyer's performance. Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at
2067, citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980). Although no conflict of interest
due to multiple representation was present in Whiteside, the court held that a limited
presumption of prejudice should apply due to the attorney's threats to testify against
his client. 744 F.2d at 1330. The court held that these threats, like conflicts of inter-
est, breached an attorney's duty of loyalty to his client. Id.
119. Whiteside, 750 F.2d 713.
120. Id. at 714.
121. Id. Judge Gibson dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc. He argued
that the court erred in presuming prejudice in its earlier opinion. He disagreed that
Whiteside was prejudiced "when he testified fully in his defense and was restricted
only in the sense that he did not testify falsely." Id. at 715 (John Gibson, J., dissent-
ing). In addition, Judge Gibson argued that the court should reconsider the case en
banc because the majority failed to provide any guidelines for a lawyer in a similar
position. Id. at 716.
Judge Fagg, joined by Judges Ross and Bowman, also dissented. Judge Fagg
took an opposite view of the attorney's conduct, stating, "I have no difficulty in tak-
ing the position that a lawyer who insists upon truthful testimony is beyond reproach
and his conduct is professionally reasonable." Id. at 717 (Fagg, J., dissenting). He
did not agree that a lawyer who advises a client to tell the truth creates a conflict of
interest. Id.
Chief Judge Lay concurred in the denial of a rehearing, contending that Judge
Fagg totally misread the earlier Whiteside holding. Id. at 716 (Lay, CJ., concurring).
The issue in Whiteside, he pointed out, was not that the attorney demanded truthful
testimony, but that he threatened to testify against his client. Id. at 717.
122. Nix v. Whiteside, 53 U.S.L.W. 3739 (U.S. Apr. 15, 1985) (No. 84-1321).
123. The case is to be argued in the fall of 1985. Taylor, Legal Community and Top
Court Debate Lawyer's Duty When Clients Lie, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1985, at Y29, col. 1.
124. 741 F.2d at 1106.
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the close of the prosecution's case. Counsel apparently believed that
a successful motion would expose the defendant to prosecution for
more serious charges.125
Bell's conviction was affirmed by the Arkansas Supreme Court.12 6
After further exhausting his state remedies,12 7 Bell filed a writ of
habeas corpus in federal court, arguing that his counsel was constitu-
tionally ineffective in not making a motion for a directed verdict. If
the motion had been made, he argued, it would have been granted
based on the evidence.128 The district court denied Bell's petition.
The court based its decision on a magistrate's finding that the law-
yer's failure to move for a directed verdict did not fall below the level
of competence required of counsel and thus did not prejudice
Bell. 129
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed, stating, "The presumption
in favor of counsel's judgment is strong, and we owe that judgment a
heavy measure of deference."13o The court conceded that had coun-
sel moved for a directed verdict, Bell may have not been convicted
on both counts, but cautioned that hindsight should not be used in
evaluating the effectiveness of counsel.l31
IV. PRISONERS' RIGHTS
The 1984-1985 term found the Eighth Circuit grappling with diffi-
cult issues concerning prisoners' rights. In three notable cases, the
court dealt with strong arguments from both government and pris-
oners. These arguments ultimately required the court to balance
competing interests.
In Hahn v. McLey, 132 the court dealt with two distinct issues: what
is necessary to demonstrate a violation of a prisoner's eighth amend-
ment rights; and whether a prisoner may have the assistance of a
125. Id.
126. Bell v. State, 270 Ark. 1, 603 S.W.2d 397 (1980).
127. Bell had filed a petition for permission to proceed under Rule 37 of the Ar-
kansas Rules of Criminal Procedure challenging the effectiveness of his counsel. 741
F.2d at 1107. The Arkansas Supreme Court denied the petition in an unpublished
order. Id.
128. Id. Bell maintained that he was not guilty of interference with a police officer,
but rather was guilty of a misdemeanor, the lesser offense of resisting arrest. Id.; cf
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-1.1 to 4-8.6 (2d ed. 1980) (setting out
guidelines for defense counsel).
129. 741 F.2d at 1107. The magistrate further concluded that Arkansas law was
unsettled at the time of Bell's case, and thus, it was not clear how the law would be
applied or whether a motion for a directed verdict would have been successful. Id.
130. Id. at 1109.
131. Id.; see Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065 (1984) ("every effort
[should] be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight" in ineffective assist-
ance of counsel cases).
132. 737 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1984).
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fellow inmate as a legal representative at a proceeding outside the
prison compound.
Hahn, an inmate at the Iowa State Penitentiary, injured his wrist
playing football on prison grounds. He was treated by a nurse and
given medication for pain.t33 Later, he was examined by a physi-
cian's assistant after Hahn complained of continued pain.i34 Hahn
was transported to the University of Iowa Medical Center, where he
was given a prescription for a pain medication to be administered
four times a day as needed.135 Hahn, however, maintained that he
never received his medication after requesting it.136 He then filed a
section 1983 action, alleging that the prison officials' failure to pro-
vide him with the medication constituted cruel and unusual punish-
ment in violation of the eighth amendment. 137 The district court
upheld Hahn's claim, finding that the officials' deliberate indiffer-
ence to his medical needs constituted cruel and unusual
punishment. 138
A three-judge panel of the Eighth Circuit reversed the district
court.' 3 9 Hahn argued that the defendants had access to reports
which stated that he did not receive his medication.140 Their failure
to ascertain whether he had received medication, Hahn contended,
amounted to deliberate indifference to his well-being.141 The court,
however, rejected his argument. The court held that the record
failed to show that the physician's assistant or the director of nursing
at the penitentiary created or condoned a policy of depriving prison-
ers of medication.142
On appeal, the state also raised an issue concerning the district
court's appointment of a legal assistant for Hahn from the prison
133. Id. at 772.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 772-73; see also supra note 63 and accompanying text.
138. Hahn, 737 F.2d at 772-73. The district court found that the physician's assis-
tant's position of authority in the prison infirmary allowed him to be personally re-
sponsible for Hahn's failure to receive the medication. Id. The lower court also
found that the director of nursing at the penitentiary could not explain why Hahn
had not received the medication. Thus, their involvement was "such that it
amounted to an official policy." Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. The court noted the district court's finding that the medication was to be
given as needed. Thus, it was possible to infer that Hahn had not requested any
medication. Id. The court also pointed out that neither the physician's assistant nor
the director of nursing was in charge of handing out medication, and thus neither of
them was aware that Hahn was being improperly denied medication. Id. As a result,
"the district court's finding that McLey and Dischler are personally liable for Hahn's
alleged deprivations is clearly erroneous." Id.
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population. The Eighth Circuit, in an unusual move, considered the
question even though it was not dispositive to the outcome of the
case. Hahn requested that a fellow inmate assist Hahn to prepare his
case in the district court.1 43 The assistant was allowed to accompany
Hahn outside the prison to serve as his trial counsel. 144
The Eighth Circuit expressed its disapproval of this practice.145
Although it recognized a prisoner's right to effective access to the
courts, the panel argued that allowing inmates to assist other inmates
outside the prison creates a serious security hazard.14 6 The court
also pointed out that it was inappropriate for inmates other than the
complainant to cross-examine prison officials.14 7 Thus, penal insti-
tutions should not allow inmate assistants to serve as actual trial
counsel in judicial proceedings either inside or outside the prison. 148
The court provided further guidance as to what constitutes delib-
erate indifference to a prisoner's rights in Martin v. White. 149 In Mar-
tin, two inmates of a Missouri penitentiary brought a section 1983
action against the superintendent of the institution. They alleged
that the superintendent's failure to take steps to protect them from
numerous sexual assaults by other inmates violated their eighth
amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment.150 The
case was tried before ajury, but at the close of the plaintiffs case, the
magistrate granted the defendant's motion for a directed verdict.151
On appeal, a panel of the Eighth Circuit held that the magistrate
erred by not allowing the case to go to the jury.152 The court, after
recognizing a prisoner's right to be free from attack,153 set forth the
elements necessary to show a violation of the eighth amendment.
According to the panel, a pervasive risk of harm must be demon-
143. Id. at 774.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. The court stated that, "Additional security is required to watch the in-
mate both during transportation and during court proceedings." Id.
147. Id. The court argued that "serious problems relating to the internal manage-
ment of prisons could arise from allowing prisoner interrogation of guards or other
officials." Id.
148. Id. The court noted that its decision would not affect most prisoners' right of
access to the courts since a prisoner may be appointed counsel upon a prima facie
showing of indigency. Id. (citing Nelson v. Redfield Lithograph Printing, 728 F.2d
1003 (8th Cir. 1984) (when indigent presents colorable civil claim, court should or-
der appointment of counsel on request)).
149. 742 F.2d 469 (8th Cir. 1984).
150. Id. at 470-71; see supra note 63 and accompanying text.
151. Martin, 742 F.2d at 471.
152. See id. at 474-75.
153. "Subjecting prisoners to violent attacks or sexual assaults, or constant fear of
such violence, shocks modern sensibilities and serves no legitimate penological pur-
pose." Id. at 474.
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strated.154 Furthermore, the plaintiff must show that the defendant
knew of the risk but failed to respond to that risk.'55 The combina-
tion of the risk of harm and the defendant's failure to respond may
show a reckless disregard of the plaintiff's right to be free from
attacks. '
56
Applying this standard, the court first pointed to statistical evi-
dence,157 as well as the defendant's own admissions,t58 which con-
firmed that sexual assaults occur regularly in the prison. Thus, ajury
could have found a pervasive risk of harm to the plaintiffs.t59 Sec-
ond, the court emphasized the defendant's failure to develop policies
which would have adequately protected the plaintiffs.160 As a result,
a jury could have found that the superintendent failed to reasonably
respond to the risks of inmate assaults and, therefore, may have ac-
ted with reckless disregard of the plaintiffs' eighth amendment
rights.16'
The Eighth Circuit faced different prisoners' rights issues in Parker
v. Corrothers, 162 a decision dealing with the constitutionality of an Ar-
kansas parole statute. Two parolees filed section 1983 actions' 6 3 al-
leging that the Arkansas parole system infringed upon their
fourteenth amendment due process rights. The district court dis-
missed their petitions on the grounds that the relevant statutes gov-
erning parole do not give rise to a protected liberty interest.'64
154. Id.; see Withers v. Levine, 615 F.2d 158, 161 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
849 (1980) (pervasive risk exists if violence and sexual assaults occur with sufficient
frequency that prisoners are put in reasonable fear for their safety).
155. Martin, 742 F.2d at 475.
156. Id. at 474; see Branchcomb v. Brewer, 669 F.2d 1297, 1298 (8th Cir.), appeal
after remand, 683 F.2d 251 (8th Cir. 1982).
157. The court pointed out that inmate assaults were commonplace at the Mis-
souri Training Center. Martin, 742 F.2d at 471-72. The court pointed to statistics
which showed that there were 59 actual reported assaults and 300 claimed assaults
from 1979 to April 1983. Id. In addition, many assaults go unreported. Id. at 472.
For a discussion of the pervasive nature of sexual assaults in prison, see United States
v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 419 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
158. The defendants stipulated that assaults occurred on a regular basis. Martin,
742 F.2d at 472.
159. Id. at 474.
160. The court pointed to the district court's findings that the prison guards, be-
cause of where they were stationed, provided little protection for inmates. Id. at 475.
Second, prison officials failed to develop a policy for discovering defective cell blocks
and thus violent inmates could enter other inmate's cells. Id. Third, the super-
intendant failed to report many assaults for prosecution. Id. Thus, the combination
of these acts "not only failed to reasonably protect inmates, but may have actually
encouraged inmates to attack others with impunity." Id.
161. Id. at 474-75.
162. 750 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1984).
163. Id. at 655; see supra note 63 and accompanying text.
164. Parker, 750 F.2d at 655. But see Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal &
Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979). The United States Supreme Court stated
10891985]
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On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's holding
that the statute did not create a protected liberty interest.165 To de-
termine whether the statute created such an interest, the court ap-
plied two standards. First, it considered whether the statute
contained particular substantive standards or criteria used to guide
parole decisions.166 Second, it examined whether the statute used
mandatory language which limited the parole board's discretion.167
The appellants conceded that the Arkansas statutes, because they
contained permissive language, failed the mandatory language
test.' 68 Nevertheless, the appellants argued that the statute pro-
vided sufficient restrictions on the parole board's discretion to create
a liberty interest in parole.169 The court disagreed. The court
pointed to the almost unlimited discretion in the statute and held
that the Arkansas parole statutes did not create a liberty interest.170
The court then considered whether the parole regulations promul-
gated pursuant to the statute created a protected liberty interest.171
They applied the same two standards governing the statute and
reached an opposite result concerning the regulations. The court
first found that the regulations set forth "particularized substantive
that, although there is no constitutional right to parole, the statute governing parole
may create a protected liberty interest. Id. at 7-12. An expectation of release may be
given constitutional protection if the statutory language is mandatory in character.
See id. at 12; see also Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981)
(approving Greenholtz; no statutory mandate present); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460
(1983) (administrative segregation statute created liberty interest); Olim v.
Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 (1983) (state may create a liberty interest through sub-
stantive limitations).
165. Parker, 750 F.2d at 655.
166. Id. at 656.
167. Id.; see Williams v. Missouri Bd. of Probation & Parole, 661 F.2d 697, 699 (8th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 993 (1982) (protected liberty interest found because
of mandatory language in statute); infra note 173 and accompanying text.
168. Parker, 750 F.2d at 656-57. The Arkansas statute provided, "The Parole
Board may release on parole any individual eligible ...when in its opinion there is
reasonable probability the prisoner can be released without detriment to the commu-
nity or himself." ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2808 (1977) (emphasis added).
169. Parker, 750 F.2d at 657.
170. Id. The court cited ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2804 which provides:
The Parole Board shall have the power to determine what persons shall be
placed on parole and to fix the time and conditions of such parole. . . .All
policies, rules and regulations regarding parole shall be formulated by the
Parole Board.
Id.; see Parker, 750 F.2d at 657-58.
171. Parker, 750 F.2d at 658. The court considered this issue even though the
district court had not addressed it. Id. The court also considered the regulation even
though it was not clear from the record when it was adopted or whether it was
promulgated pursuant to the Arkansas Administrative Procedure Act. Id. at 658-59.
The court concluded that the board did adopt the regulation with the intent of fol-
lowing it. Id.
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criteria which significantly guide the Board's discretionary decision
to grant or deny parole release."' 72 Second, the court held that the
regulations did create a liberty interest.173
The court remanded the case to the district court to determine if
the regulations were in effect at the time the appellants committed
the crimes for which they were imprisoned. If the regulations did
apply, the district court was to determine the procedural safeguards
necessary to ensure that they would receive due process.
Judge Gibson filed an opinion in which he concurred in part and
dissented in part. He agreed with the majority's holding that the Ar-
kansas statute did not create a liberty interest, but disagreed with the
majority's conclusion that the regulations did create such an interest.
Judge Gibson pointed to language in the regulations which author-
ized the board to refuse parole because of other considerations.t74
Thus, he argued, the regulations placed "too broad a discretion in
the parole board to conclude that a liberty interest exists."175 He
further warned that the courts should not interfere with the parole
process unless a clear constitutional violation exists, a problem he
did not believe was presented in Parker. 176
V. OTHER DECISIONS
A. Jury Selection
In Russell v. Wyrick, 177 the defendant filed a habeas corpus petition
alleging that the state court jury that convicted him was improperly
selected, thus violating his due process rights. A Missouri statute
allowed the sheriff to summon bystander jurors if the list of jurors
provided by the Jury Commission was reduced to less than twenty-
four persons.'7 8 At Russell's state court trial, the veniremen were
called from the bystander list as prospective jurors.179 Russell ar-
gued that the same list was used many times and that persons on the
list enjoyed serving on juries, thus making them conviction-prone.180
172. Id. at 661 (citing Evans v. Dillahunty, 662 F.2d 522, 526 (8th Cir. 1981)).
173. Id. The court compared the language of the regulation to that contained in
the Nebraska statute held to have created a liberty interest in Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at
11-12. The Nebraska statute stated that the Board of Parole shall order parole unless
it determines that one or more substantive reasons for deferral should apply to the
case. NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1,114(1) (1976).
174. 750 F.2d at 664 (Floyd Gibson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. 736 F.2d 462 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1203 (1985).
178. Id. at 463.
179. Id.
180. Id. Russell also maintained that because many jurors are repeaters, the sher-
iff may then know about a particular juror's propensity to convict or acquit. Id. at
463-64.
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The district court, however, found that the jury selection procedure
used in Russell's case was not improper and thus denied his writ of
habeas corpus.18'
On appeal, a panel of the Eighth Circuit affirmed.182 The court
recognized that "[t]he dangers from sheriff selection of jurors are
several,"' 83 and pointed to the possibility that the sheriff could
choose jurors whom the sheriff believed to be more willing to con-
vict. t 8 4 Nevertheless, the court pointed to the district court's find-
ings that showed the sheriffs office had no connection with the
investigation.185 Furthermore, the court emphasized that the deputy
who actually made the selection knew only one of the persons who
was summoned for jury duty in Russell's trial.186
Judge Heaney filed a dissenting opinion. He pointed out that it
was unclear from the record whether or not any of the persons on
the bystander list actually served on Russell's jury because of their
acquaintance with the sheriff or others in his office. 187 If anyone was
on the list for that reason, Judge Heaney would have reversed, since
in such a situation "the potential for selecting a conviction-prone
jury from that list rises to the level of fundamental unfairness."18 8
Thus, Judge Heaney argued, the case should have been remanded
for further findings on this issue.189
B. Probation
In United States v. Missouri Valley Construction Co., 190 the district court
imposed a two million dollar fine on the defendant for violating the
Sherman Act.' 9 ' The company had pleaded guilty to two counts of
bid rigging arising out of the defendant's conspiracy with other con-
tractors to rig bids in connection with highway construction con-
181. Russell v. Wyrick, 566 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D. Mo. 1984).
182. Russell, 736 F.2d 462.
183. Id. at 463.
184. Id.; see Henson v. Wyrick, 634 F.2d 1080 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
958 (1981); Thompson v. White, 661 F.2d 103 (8th cir. 1981), vacated, 456 U.S. 941
(1982), on remand, 680 F.2d 1173 (8th Cir. 1982).
185. Russell, 736 F.2d at 463. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court found
that city police officers from another town investigated the crime. Id. In addition,
neither the sheriff nor a deputy were called to testify on behalf of the prosecution in
Russell's trial. Id.
186. Id. at 464.
187. Id. (Heaney, J., dissenting).
188. Id. Judge Heaney further reasoned that "we ignore human nature to suppose
that a sheriff or deputy would suggest the name of an acquaintance known to sympa-
thize with the rights of the accused." Id. at 465.
189. Id.
190. 741 F.2d 1542 (8th Cir. 1984).
191. Id. at 1544.
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tracts.19 2 In the district court, the defendant moved for reduction of
the sentence. In response to the defendant's motions, the district
court suspended all but $325,000 of the fine and placed the defend-
ant on probation for five years. The probation term, however, was
subject to the condition that the defendant contribute $1,475,000 to
the University of Nebraska Foundation "for the purpose of perma-
nently endowing and supporting a chair in ethics."1 9 3 The govern-
ment, on appeal, challenged the validity of the sentence.
The Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed.194 The court recog-
nized that the federal probation statute provided the trial court with
wide discretion to "fashion probationary conditions appropriate to
each case."' 9 5 The court, however, emphasized that the statute indi-
cates only two categories where payment of money may be imposed
in addition to the imposition of a fine: (1) a sentencing court may
require the defendant to make support payments, "but only to those
for whose support he is legally responsible;" (2) "restitution or repa-
ration may be required but it is to be paid only to 'aggrieved parties'
and is limited to 'actual damages or loss caused by the offense for
which conviction was had.' "196 The court further reasoned that the
University of Nebraska Foundation suffered no actual damage or loss
from the defendant. The amount the lower court required the de-
fendant to pay was not "related in any way to the amount of harm
caused by the defendants' offense."' 197 Thus, the Eighth Circuit con-
cluded that the district court lacked the authority under the federal
probation statute to order the Missouri Valley Construction Com-
pany to make payments to the University of Nebraska Foundation. 198
192. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) (any contract, combination, or conspiracy in re-
straint of trade is punishable as a felony and upon conviction, subject to a fine not
exceeding $1,000,000).
193. Missouri Valley, 741 F.2d at 1545. The lower court further stipulated that the
chair was not to be identified with the defendants or its officers. Id. The defendant
would not participate in the administration of the chair. Id. Moreover, the defendant
would not be able to claim the contribution as an income tax deduction.
194. Id. at 1550-51. The appeal was originally set to be heard by a three-judge
panel, but since the appeal raised the possibility that a prior decision concerning this
issue might be overruled, the court decided to hear the case en banc. Id. at 1546.
195. Id. at 1546-47. Title 18 of the United States Code provides, in pertinent part:
any court ... when satisfied that the ends ofjustice and the best interest of
the public as well as the defendant will be served thereby, may suspend the
imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation
for such period and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems
best.
18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982).
196. 741 F.2d at 1547; see 18 U.S.C. § 3651.
197. 741 F.2d at 1549.
198. Id. at 1550. The court stated that public policy considerations supported its
decision. "[C]ourts are ill-equipped to pick and choose, among countless worthy
causes, which nonaggrieved charitable organizations should receive large sums of
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C. Trial Practice
In United States v. Earley, 199 the issue raised was whether or not the
district court may receive a trial brief which outlines expected testi-
mony from proposed witnesses, where the brief was not made avail-
able to defense counsel. The district attorney provided a fifty-five
page trial brief outlining the expected testimony of 120 potential
government witnesses.200 Defense counsel requested a copy of the
brief, but both the district attorney and the court refused to give him
a copy. 20 ' Earley was then convicted of aggravated larceny and sen-
tenced to life imprisonment. 2 02 His conviction was affirmed on
appeal. 2o3
Earley moved to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence based on
the lower court's and the government's refusal to give his counsel a
copy of the brief. The district court, however, found that the brief
was not an improper ex parte communication and did not cause bias
or prejudice to deny Earley a fair trial.204
On appeal, Earley again argued that the district court judge should
not have received the brief without requiring a copy to be given to
Earley's attorney.20 5 Earley further maintained that his attorney's
failure to more vigorously demand a copy of the brief or raise the
money that would otherwise be paid to the treasury as fines." Id. For a discussion of
probationary issues relating to corporate defendants, see Levin, Corporate Probation
Conditions: Judicial Creativity or Abuse of Discretion, 52 FORDIAM L. REV. 637 (1984).
Judge Heaney concurred in the result of the majority, but joined in Judge Gib-
son's dissenting opinion. Judge Heaney added that he would sustain payments to
charitable foundations or educational institutions if certain guidelines were followed.
741 F.2d at 1551 (Heaney, J., concurring and dissenting). He maintained that the
imposition of fines paid to the government has done little to deter corporate crime.
Id. Thus, Judge Heaney suggested requiring a corporation to fund a chair in corpo-
rate ethics at a university as a condition of probation and identifying the chair as one
funded through an involuntary contribution. Id.
Judge Gibson concurred in the result but dissented from the court's overruling
of United States v. William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 1982). 741 F.2d at
1551 (John Gibson, J., concurring in the result and dissenting). In Anderson, the court
held that corporate defendants should only be required to pay money to a charitable
or educational institution when there is a connection between the defendants and the
institution. 698 F.2d at 914. Judge Gibson agreed that the sentence in Missouri Valley
bore no relationship to the party damaged by the defendant's activities. 741 F.2d at
1554. Nevertheless, Judge Gibson stated that "the Court makes a great mistake in
failing to distinguish the limited situation in Anderson, and in discarding the valuable
role that it can play in corporate probation." Id.
199. 746 F.2d 412 (8th Cir. 1984).
200. Id. at 412-13.
201. Id. at 413.
202. Id. at 414.
203. United States v. Earley, 657 F.2d 195 (8th Cir. 1981).
204. Earley, 746 F.2d at 414.
205. Id.
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issue on appeal constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.206
The Eighth Circuit agreed that it was improper for the district
court judge to accept the brief from the prosecution. The court sug-
gested that other more appropriate avenues were available which
would acomplish the same result.207 Since Earley was unable to
show any prejudice resulting from the district court's actions, how-
ever, the three-judge panel denied him any relief. Reviewing the
"overwhelming and vivid evidence of guilt" presented in the case,
the court determined that the brief could not have affected his sen-
tence. 208 Since Earley had suffered no prejudice, the court also re-
jected his claim that his attorney's failure to more vigorously attempt
to obtain the brief denied him effective counsel.209
D. Pretrial Publicity
United States v. Faul2 to arose out of a heavily publicized, fatal
shootout in a small North Dakota town.21' Two of the defendants
were convicted of second-degree murder and various other charges
while another was convicted of conspiracy and concealing a fugi-
tive. 2 12 On appeal, the defendants alleged that they were denied a
fair trial because the district court refused to grant their motion for a
206. Earley also argued that the district court erred in denying his motion without
an evidentiary hearing. Id.
207. Id. at 417. The court suggested that "early identification of evidentiary issues
may be more appropriately made under Rule 17.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure" rather than through submission of ex parte trail briefs. Id.
208. Id. at 419.
209. Id.; see Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2064 (prejudice from omissions of counsel
must be shown in order to show ineffective assistance of counsel).
210. 748 F.2d 1204 (8th Cir. 1984) petition for cert. filed, 53 U.S.L.W. 3722 (U.S.
Feb. 22, 1985) (No. 84-1373).
211. Two United States marshalls were killed during the incident, which occurred
on February 13, 1983 outside Medina, North Dakota. Id. at 1207. A United States
marshall, a county sheriff, and a city police officer were also injured. Id. The
shootout arose out of authorities' efforts to apprehend Gordon Kahl, who was con-
victed in 1977 for failing to file income taxes. Id. at 1226 (Lay, CJ., dissenting). Kahl
was a member of the Posse Comitatus, an extremist organization which advocated
income tax evasion. Id. After serving time in prison for failing to file income tax
returns, Kahl was placed on probation and returned to North Dakota. Id. at 1208.
Since Kahl violated his probation, a warrant was issued for his arrest. Id. The Febru-
ary 13 shootout occurred while police were trying to apprehend Kahl. See id. at 1226-
27. Kahl managed to escape the North Dakota authorities. See id A nationwide man-
hunt ensued. United States v. Udey, 748 F.2d 1231, 1235 (8th Cir. 1984). On June
3, 1983, another shootout occurred at Smithville, Arkansas in which Kahl and a local
law enforcement officer were both killed. Id. The Eighth Circuit upheld the convic-
tions of those persons harboring Kahl following his escape from authorities in North
Dakota in Udey, 748 F.2d 1231.
212. 748 F.2d at 1207-08. Scott Faul and Yorie Kahl, Gordon Kahl's son, were
convicted of second-degree murder while David Broer was convicted of conspiracy
and harboring charges. Id. at 1208.
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change of venue.213 They maintained that the publicity in North Da-
kota was so pervasive that they could not have received a fair trial
there.
A three-judge panel of the Eighth Circuit disagreed with the de-
fendants' contention. Although the court conceded that the media
coverage in the case was widespread, the coverage was nevertheless
not of the extent proscribed by the Supreme Court in the cases re-
lied on by the appellants. 214
Likewise, the court rejected the defendants' claim that the voir dire
proceedings demonstrated prejudice because of heavy pretrial pub-
licity. The transcript showed that thirty-nine of the seventy-eight eli-
gible jurors were dismissed because of partiality. The court did not
find that statistic compelling enough to support the defendants' con-
tention.215 In addition, the court emphasized that the district court
took steps to insure that impartial jurors were selected. First, 114
persons were selected as potential jurors, which is "a substantially
larger jury pool than is utilized in most cases." 216 Second, the de-
fendants were allowed sixteen peremptory challenges as opposed the
usual ten.2 17 Finally, the lower court judge explained the impor-
tance of partiality to potential jurors.218
In a lengthy dissent, Chief Judge Lay contended that the "record
amply demonstrates the defendants did not and could not receive a
fair trial in the District of North Dakota."219 He maintained that a
more strict standard governs review of a federal district court's re-
fusal to grant a change of venue.220 Thus, the majority's reliance on
213. Id. at 1210. The defendants raised a number of other issues on appeal. They
alleged that the district court judge should have excused himself from the case since
he had a professional or personal relationship with the deceased marshalls. Id. The
Eighth Circuit held that the evidence failed to establish any bias on the judge's part.
Id. at 1210-11. The defendants also alleged that evidence was improperly admitted,
that the evidence was insufficient to convict, and that the prosecutor committed mis-
conduct. The court found the defendants' arguments to be without merit. Id. at
1223.
214. Id. at 1211-16; see Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (carnival atmos-
phere at trial and massive pretrial publicity denied accused a fair trial); Estes v.
Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (intrusiveness of press and presence of television cam-
eras and equipment prejudiced accused); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963)
(trial a hollow formality when citizens of community shown television footage of ac-
cused confessing to murder under police interrogation on television).
215. 748 F.2d at 1273. In addition, the court pointed out that only 21 of the 39
persons indicated that they were impartial because of media coverage. Id.
216. Id. at 1214.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1214-15.
219. Id. at 1223 (Lay, CJ., dissenting).
220. Id. at 1224; see Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 797 (1975) (federal court's
review of denial of change of venue request in federal prosecution based on supervi-
1096 [Vol. I11
24
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 4 [1985], Art. 7
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol11/iss4/7
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
United States Supreme Court decisions governing pretrial publicity
in state criminal prosecutions was misplaced.
In addition, Judge Lay contended that jurors' assurances of neu-
trality were not enough to guarantee a fair trial.221 According to
Judge Lay, the court should have considered other factors in review-
ing the district court's denial of a motion for a change of venue.
These factors include:
[T]he extent of circulation of publicity concerning the event in the
community, the severity and sensationalism of the offense, the fa-
miliarity of the jurors with the individuals involved, the length of
time between the publicity and the trial, the prospective jurors' ex-
posure to the publicity, the connection of government officials with
the release of the publicity, and the character and size of the dis-
trict from which jurors will be selected. 2 22
Judge Lay applied these factors and concluded that the defendants
did not receive a fair trial. He noted that from February 14 to March
29, 1983, a Fargo newspaper printed sixty-eight news stories and
twenty-two pictures relating to the case. 223 Judge Lay argued that
the anger and shock over the deaths of the United States marshalls
pervaded North Dakota, thus creating prejudice toward the defend-
ants. 22 4 Judge Lay also noted that the publicity surrounding the case
linked the defendants with Gordon Kahl's involvement with the
Posse Comitatus, a radical organization.225 All of these factors,
Judge Lay argued, should have been considered in determining
whether the defendants received a fair trial.226
sory role in enforcing criminal law in federal courts and not a matter of constitutional
compulsion).
221. 748 F.2d at 1225.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1227. One-third of the pictures and articles appeared on the front
page. Id.
224. Id. According to Judge Lay, both officers were well-liked and respected in
the community. Id.
225. Id. Judge Lay's dissent provided dates and newspaper highlights indicating
the media-created connection between the defendants and Gordon Kahl. See id. at
1227-30.
226. Id. at 1230.
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